



DATE: May 25, 2015

TO: Ames Laboratory Personnel

FROM: Mark Murphy
Chief Operations Officer

SUBJECT: Annual Counterintelligence Awareness Briefing

Although the Ames Laboratory does not perform classified research and very few of our staff hold security clearances, we are still part of the DOE laboratory complex, and are aware that we are occasionally probed in various ways by foreign intelligence services. Because of this foreign interest in the Lab, and also in accordance with DOE Orders, all personnel at the Ames Laboratory will receive annual briefings on counterintelligence (CI) and their responsibilities as they relate to CI. Awareness of these issues helps to protect individuals who could potentially be targeted as a source of information.

This memo sets forth current CI information relevant to all Ames Laboratory employees and will serve to meet the briefing requirement. Please review the memo carefully to ensure that you are aware of your responsibilities.

DOE CI Reporting Requirement

As required by Presidential Directive, DOE has established an extensive CI reporting system. Portions of the DOE system do not apply to Ames Laboratory as no classified work is performed here. However, certain requirements apply to all Lab personnel, including certain **professional, personal** and **financial relationship information**. These requirements are detailed below:

Professional Relationships:

Employees are required to report professional contacts and relationships with nationals of sensitive countries, whether they occur at the workplace or abroad. These relationships can be reported through trip reports, foreign visits and assignments forms, proposals, or other formal and routine documentation of professional activity. Information may also be gathered directly by a DOE Counterintelligence Officer (CIO). The DOE CIO is informed of all travel to sensitive countries through the foreign travel request process. Any travel involving financial support from a foreign country, sensitive or non-sensitive, must also be reported directly to a CIO. The employees involved may receive pre- and post-travel debriefings by a DOE CIO at the CIO's discretion. The DOE CIO also receives copies of all foreign visit and assignment forms and work-for-others proposals with foreign companies which allows them to review foreign interactions. Briefings and debriefings may arise from these types of interactions as well.

The Ames Laboratory understands and respects the importance of collaboration through foreign visits and visitors in reaching scientific goals. At the same time, it is important to protect against

attempts to collect information the Lab does not want to share. The objective of the CI Program is to ensure accountability related to providing foreign scientists access to property, equipment, and computer systems associated with a U.S. Government Agency.

The reputations of both the Ames Laboratory and the DOE could be harmed if an incident involving a visiting scientist performing activities that Lab employees were unaware of occurred during a visit, or if established procedures are ignored. This would be especially true if the visitor came from a country where enhanced vigilance during their visit/assignment would be prudent.

Hosting foreign nationals does not require constant monitoring or scrutiny, but hosts need to have an overall awareness of activities and the status of the project or assignment. All Ames Laboratory employees need to take note of and report any anomalies.

At a minimum, the host should:

- meet each individual they are hosting;
- designate an employee to provide daily supervision/coordination, and instruct them to report any instances of concern to the host;
- be knowledgeable of the level of computer access granted to the visitor and whether they will retain computer access after the visit/assignment is complete;
- be knowledgeable of the access to physical premises the visitor is granted both during normal and off hours;
- understand the reason if a visit/assignment is curtailed prematurely;
- know when a visit/assignment has been completed; and
- know when a visit/assignment has been extended and whether the visitor met the goals of the project/assignment.

Any relationships not captured through the travel or trip report mechanism, the foreign visits and assignments forms or work-for-others proposals are to be reported to [Mark Murphy, Ames Laboratory Chief Operations Officer](#), who will inform a DOE CIO if necessary.

Personal Relationships:

Substantive personal relationships with sensitive country foreign nationals who are not permanent resident aliens or family members are also to be reported to Mr. Murphy. A substantive relationship is one that is enduring and involves substantial sharing of personal information and/or the formation of emotional bonds. An enduring relationship is one that has existed, or is expected to exist, for a substantial period of time (months or years). Substantial sharing of personal information involves discussion of “private” information (things one would not routinely share with strangers) about oneself. Emotional bonds refer to feelings of affection or emotional attachment in a relationship. Because the concepts of “personal information” and “emotional bonds” are necessarily subjective, reliance must be placed on the judgment of each individual as to the existence of, and reporting threshold for, these criteria. Examples of such relationships are provided in the attached table.

Financial Relationships:

In addition to professional and personal relationships, certain financial relationships are also reportable. Substantive business transactions with citizens of sensitive countries who are not permanent resident aliens are to be reported to Mr. Murphy whether they involve a one-time

interaction or an on-going financial relationship. This requirement pertains to non-incidental financial transactions; small payments for things such as house cleaning or other personal services are not included in the requirement. Partnerships or other business interests or investments are the focus of this reporting requirement because they include the potential for exploitation or pressure. Financial support provided to family members is not included.

Presidential Decision Directive / National Security Council – 12

PDD/NSC -12 requires the Ames Laboratory to report **any** approaches or contacts by organizations or individuals of **any** nationality, including U.S. citizens, within or outside the scope of official activities in which:

- 1) illegal unauthorized access is sought to classified or sensitive information, technology or special nuclear materials, or
- 2) the individual believes that he or she may be the target of an attempted exploitation by a foreign government or any other suspicious request for information.

Anyone receiving unsolicited emails from individuals in terrorist-supporting or “T4” countries (Cuba, Iran, Sudan or Syria) is asked to forward a copy of the email to [Mark Murphy](#). Please include complete header information on any email you forward to Mr. Murphy.

While the threat of personal risk to Ames Laboratory employees from individuals from foreign countries is not anticipated, adhering to the guidelines in this memo will allow our CI Program to ensure that suspicious activities are identified and managed appropriately.